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"This does not imply a radical change in the more traditional 
methods of control. The main use of financial appraisal is still to 
stimulate the judgement of those who initiated the project in the first 
place".<!) 
" ... this is not a new idea. It is being used I suppose to describe the 
more rigorous and more developed methodology used in the 
application of an old idea which is that before one embarks on an 
expensive major capital project one should look at both capital and 
running costs of it and alternative ways of providing the service. We 
would say that in our major programme which began in the '60s we 
always endeavoured to do that; though perhaps with less rigour than 
we might have done". (2) 
Introduction 
The purpose behind 'option appraisal' is to make the best use of 
resources at the government's disposal from the point of view of all parties 
and not simply from that of the government department with funds to 
spend. Proposals may previously have been appraised one way or another. 
The distinctive feature of 'option' appraisal is to introduce the economic 
element in a "more rigorous" way. Such evidence as we have suggests that 
the few occasions when option appraisal has been applied have been to 
prospective capital schemes. Whilst this is where choices are often most 
visible, in fact the principles are as applicable to assets already in public 
ownership as to those to be acquired<3l, and to programmes involving 
recurrent expenditure (i.e. revenue allocations) as to those involving the 
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capital budget. 
Option appraisal within the Scottish Health Service has the 
appearance of the 'flavour of the month'. Yet as the first quote shows, 
within the public sector as a whole, the principles implied by option 
appraisal can scarcely be regarded as novel; indeed they have been applied 
to the nationalised industries since 1962. <4> However, the general 
acceptance of these principles within the NHS has been a long time coming, 
although there are a few notable exceptions about which more will be said 
later. Certainly that acceptance was long after 1969 when all investment in 
the public sector was to have been covered. <4> The long delay is explicable in 
terms of the past tendency to appraise only major capital proposals in a 
formal manner and, in the case of the NHS, this has usually meant in effect 
appraising hospitals. Hospitals, according to a senior civil servant with 
experience of both, have a complexity comparable to aircraft carriers.<5l 
The long delay before the economic element in option appraisal was given 
formal expression may, therefore, seem excusable. The same excuse would 
not, of course, apply to the more 'straightforward' investment decisions. 
Times have changed, and minor as well as major capital expenditures 
are expected to be appraised in terms of the Treasury's current 
guidelines. <6> The Scottish Health Service - the fifteen health boards and 
the Common Services Agency- are to be given notice by the SHHD that all 
capital expenditures must be appraised this way, the the SHHD is 
preparing a manual to assist them to do so in the appropriate manner. The 
Treasury's approval is required for the more expensive hospital projects 
funded by the SHHD, whether from its own National Capital Programme 
or from the ordinary capital allocation the SHHD distributes to the health 
boards. In January 1983 hospitals costing £2 million or more would have 
required the Treasury's approval in principle.(?) The SHHD is responsible 
for the appraisal of the others and, in tum, delegates some of that 
responsibility to the health boards. 
In early 1984 the health boards were responsible for capital schemes 
funded from their Ordinary Capital allocation if they cost (a) £1 million or 
less in total if no net increase in clinical resources were involved, (b) 
£500,000 or less in total if a net increase in clinical resources were involved, 
(c) £150,000 or less in respect of building costs alone, and (d) £100,000 or 
less for schemes which had a predominantly engineering context. Schemes 
not covered by (a) to (d) would invariably have required the approval of the 
Building Division of the Common Services Agency. Schemes not covered 
by (fl) and (b) would have required the approval of the SHHD as well. The 
limits are shortly to be raised again. No such approval has been required on 
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complex medical equipment, however expensive; although the SHHD has 
had to be notified of the intention to purchase equipment costing more than 
£100,000 and orders must be made through the Supplies Division of the 
Common Services Agency. (S) In recent years the SHHD has retained about 
half its capital allocation and has been responsible for appraising its use. 
The Building Division also used to have a responsibility for monitoring the 
health boards' maintenance programmes, but this was formally transferred 
back to them in 1979. <9> 
At the time of writing 'option appraisals' have been carried out on 
three major capital proposals. In two cases- the provision of facilities for 
acute services for Fife Health Board and of facilities for the mentally 
handicapped for Dumfries and Galloway Health Board- economic advice 
came from the Health Economics Research Unit (HERU) at the University 
of Aberdeen. In the case of the third- the provision of facilities for the 
elderly for Lanarkshire Health Board - assistance came from Strathclyde 
Business School at the University of Strathclyde. It is my general 
impression that those within the Scottish Health Service still feel they have 
not acquired sufficient expertise to incorporate the economic element in 
appraisals without such external assistance as HERU has offered; though 
this lack of confidence may be dispelled once the SHHD manual for 
appraising proposals has been published and its contents are fully 
appreciated. 
Option appraisal has generated a lot of interest and activity in the 
Scottish Health Service, yet the two statements at the head of this paper 
suggest its impact on the decision reached is likely to be marginal. The two 
statements deserve to be considered, if only because of their authoritative 
sources and their common view from different perspectives of public 
service. C. D. Foster, author of the first statement, writes as a professional 
economist after several years' experience of applying appraisal at the 
Ministry of Transport (under the sympathetic leadership of Barbara 
Castle). The author of the second source is A.L. Rennie, who at the time 
was Secretary to the SHHD, and replying, under examination, to the 
Committee of Public Accounts to the prospect of implementing option 
appraisal. 
On the face of it their remarks are surprising, especially the one 
coming from the SHHD which referred to practice in the 1960s and not to 
1981 when it was made. The Treasury admits that " ... much of the work of a 
typical appraisal can be carried out competently by officials of any 
discipline ... ". (IO) But the Treasury adds that they need "proper training", 
and that "specialists" are also needed. Two specialist groups specifically 
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identified are economists and accountants. (II) However, until recently, the 
Scottish Health Service has been short of them both. 
No economists have been employed in the SHHD or the Common 
Services Agency in their capacity as economists. Nor has been SHHD or 
the Scottish Health Service made much if any use of economists employed 
elsewhere in the Scottish Office. However, since 1977 the SHHD has 
funded HERU 'inter alia' to provide economic advice to itself and the 
Scottish Health Service.(12> Since 1979 HERU has also run nine month 
correspondence courses in Health Economics; and altogether a hundred 
staff employed by the Scottish Health Service have completed it<13l, and 
would have learnt something about option appraisal as a result. Whether 
they acquired the "proper training" the Treasury argues is necessary is 
another matter. Certainly health board officials seem highly nervous at the 
prospect of option appraisal, and to be leaning unduly on external sources. 
Finally, in April1984 HERU set up a consultancy service to facilitate the 
commissioning of major studies requiring its assistance. (l4) 
Management accountants have been employed throughout the 
Scottish Health Service since its reorganisation in 1974. But in a couple of 
respects their training falls short of the Treasury's guidelines. Without 
"proper training" they would tend to ignore the impact of proposals outside 
the Scottish Health Service. In addition, they tend to think of valuing costs 
and benefits in accounting terms and not as economists. The Treasury's 
guidelines clearly demand the latter. (IS) 
If the advice of professional economists and (management) 
accountants had not been available in the 1960s, how can the Secretary's 
statement be justified? It is our answer to this historical question which 
provides the basis for assessing what impact 'option appraisal' may be 
expected to have. Several sources were used. Officials from the SHHD and 
Scottish Office, including Mr A.L. Rennie himself, the Building Division 
and a health board, and members of HERU have been interviewed. Use 
has also been made of the SHHD circulars and its various publications 
although, of course, there is no guarantee that the statements of intention 
contained in them have been carried out. One set of sources not used, but 
available for example to the Controller and Auditor General, is the 
SHHD's and health boards' documentation of appraisals. However this last 
set of sources is recognised to be an unreliable indication of how thoroughly 
proposals were appraised as the appraisals were rarely fully documented. 
These sources are used to assess how fully each ofthe Treasury's guidelines 
had been implemented. 
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The Treasury's Guidelines 
In the course of time the Treasury has added to its list of guidelines to 
be included in the appraisal of projects. The list started with discounting 
(Treasury, 1973), and the latest pamphlet identified another five. A list of 
the six is given below in the order of their application in an appraisal. In 
1982 the DHSS produced a pamphlet of its own to translate the Treasury's 
guidelines into terms more familiar to NHS officers.Ool Some regional 
health authorities have produced pamphlets of their own, and the SHHD 
has one scheduled to appear later this year (1984). 
The list of guidelines 
1. The selection of options. 
2. The identification of all costs and benefits. 
3. The quantification of costs and benefits where possible. 
4. Discounting, using the Treasury's test discount rate. 
5. The adjustment for risk and uncertainty. 
6. Backchecks and monitoring. 
As was mentioned above, these guidelines are to be applied to all 
capital projects, whether or not their eventual approval in principle must be 
obtained from the Treasury or the SHHD. There are, however, two major 
exceptions. First, the DHSS made it clear to the Public Accounts 
Committee that it did not expect clinical activities to be subject to 'cost-
benefit analysis'. (17) Cost-benefit analysis is a highly specific form of 
appraisaJ08l, one which assumes that the costs and benefits of proposals can 
be valued in financial terms. This may be a reasonable requirement for 
commercial proposals, but is hardly to be accepted readily for proposals 
which involve saving, say, lives. 
Other forms of appraisal, such as cost-effectiveness analysis, are 
possible which would satisfy the Treasury< IS) but can there be many clinical 
activities which offer more than one option to achieve the same outcome 
and so avoid the problem of measuring their respective benefits? For 
example, the treatment of chronic renal failure by dialysis or transplant in 
both cases raises life expectation, but of a very different quality. So much 
has been recognised in cost-effective analyses of this treatment.<19l 
Fortunately, in this choice the less costly method, where a choice is 
medically justified, also offers the better quality of life. But one cannot 
predict so convenient an outcome and, if the chronic renal failure example 
is indeed the exception, then the exemption of clinical activities from cost-
benefit analysis is likely to exempt the majority from any serious sort of 
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economic appraisal. It is noteworthy that the DHSS has appraised a limited 
number of clinical activities, but their economic content is regarded as "one 
factor taken into account by DHSS working groups considering whether 
such services should be introduced nationwide". (20) In addition, economic 
appraisal seems to be gathering some support from the medical profession 
itself. <21 > 
The second major exemption is strategic decisions. <22> Quite what is 
meant by the term 'strategic' has never been precisely defined, but the 
following example may help illustrate its meaning within the Civil Service. 
The decision to build a hospital is a strategic decision; the decision on its 
siting is not, and would be considered suitable for option appraisal. It would 
seem that (national) priorities, such as those contained within the SHAPE 
Report for the Scottish Health Service<23 l are another example of a strategic 
decision. Certainly they are not based on a full economic appraisal. <24> As 
the authors of the report admit, they adopted " ... a pragmatic approach, in 
which value judgements would necessarily play a particularly large 
role .. .''. <25> Priorities defined this way are liable for, and arguably deserve 
the same criticism as was directed at the members of the Royal Commission 
on the Third London Airport. They recommended one among several 
possible sites, but did not consider whether a third one was needed in the 
first place. 
Three of the six guidelines- the first, fifth and sixth- are ones which 
any government department or independent authority might be expected 
to adopt. The external pressure of the Treasury would hardly seem 
necessary, since their adoption would assist the departments in securing 
such goals as they may have. For the remainder of this section we indicate 
the role of these three and the extent they have been taken up. Only then do 
we tum to the three remaining guidelines- the second, third and fourth. 
The Selection of Options 
The obvious reason for selecting several options is the fact that the one 
first thought of might not be the one eventually preferred. It is clearly this 
guideline that the Secretary to the SHHD had in mind when referring to 
past appraisals of major capital proposals. But, as we hope to show, the 
value of comparing different options depends on whether the other 
guidelines in the list are also included. If they all are, then it would by no 
means be obvious which one would eventually be preferred until the 
appraisal were well in hand if not completed. Unfortunately, the Secretary 
did not indicate in 1981 which, if any, of the other guidelines were regularly 
included in the appraisals. 
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This is not the place for a full analysis of the options open to those 
running the health service. But a number of observations can be made 
which point to the need for certain improvements. The first observation is 
that many options do not necessarily involve clinical activities, although 
academic 'health' economists have tended to focus on this exempt group. 
Thus Williams<26l refers to choices in the type of treatment for a given 
disease (kidney dialysis or transplant), to choices in the place of treatment 
(as an in- or out-patient for the removal of varicose veins), and to the 
choices in the time of treatment (mass miniature radiography for the early 
diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis). Drummond<27> summarises over one 
hundred such studies which have been published. Many more are now 
available. The field of non-clinical activities has been largely unexplored by 
this group of economists although this omission is not likely to last long now 
that option appraisal requires formal adoption. 
Second, the choice of option is directly related to the objective of the 
proposal. Ideally that objective should be expressed in terms of the 
outcome of the proposal, say, of lives saved, care of the elderly, and so on. 
Until recently the Scottish Health Service's objectives were only in terms of 
the provision of facilities, say, of the number of beds by type per capita. In 
the end the options have to be expressed this way, but an examination of the 
quantitative guidelines used by the Scottish Health Service suggests no full 
formal analysis of both the costs and benefits of providing the facilities. <28> 
Norms expressed in terms of throughput, say of admissions per capita, are 
hardly more appropriate. Recently, however, there has been a move in the 
right direction in that objectives are also being defined in terms of 
programmes which usually refer to specific client groups such as the 
elderly. <29) This comes closer to the final output of health services although, 
in doing so, one also comes closer to evaluating clinical activities which 
have been declared exempt from cost-benefit analysis. However, if this 
sleight-of-hand is allowed to pass then sets of facilities can be selected, each 
of which best meets the objective of its respective programme given that 
programme's budget allocation. It is this approach which was adopted in 
appraising the proposal by the Dumfries and Galloway Health Board to 
make local provision for the mentally handicapped. 
Third, it is too rarely recognised that the scale of provision, whether it 
be of facilities or the programme's budget, can be varied. The DHSS 
manual, for example, makes no explicit reference to this possibility. (JO) Yet 
if the scale of provision is not considered among the options, then the 
Scottish Health Service may find itself making recommendations not very 
different from one made by the American Cancer Society that more than 
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$47 million be spent to identify a person with cancer of the colon. <31 ) 
The Secretary to the SHHD recently elaborated the extent to which 
options were considered when the Hospital Plan for Scotland, first 
published in 1962, was developed and implemented. In the first place, the 
regional hospital boards were asked to make a set of proposals which would 
take into account what catchment population the hospital would serve and 
the related problem of where it be sited. In addition, they were asked to 
consider whether functions, like maternity care, should be located at a 
single hospital or provided separately. More recently, decisions whether to 
build the hospital in phases or all at once have had to be evaluated. The 
quality of the evaluation no doubt was variable, but the intention was clear: 
to aim at functional efficiency which, in the context of acute facilities, 
meant sufficiently large developments to offer specialist services on a 24 
hours a day basis. 
At the same time the SHHD, as the Department of Health for 
Scotland became, itself made several appraisals whose eventual purpose 
was a set of design guides for hospital departments and health centres. The 
hospital departments covered were wards<32l, accident and emergency 
departments<33l, and outpatient departments. <34) In each case the aim was 
functional efficiency, by which is meant the initial definition of the 
functions of the department in question and a design solution which was 
thought would perform them most efficiently in terms of the resources 
available. The SHHD also has had access to a series of similar studies 
produced by the DHSS. The SHHD and DHSS virtually ceased publishing 
their series of design guides and hospital planning notes on reorganisation 
in 1974. Those that had been published, however, have had an important 
place in the subsequent design of hospitals and health centres. 
The next stage is construction. The responsibility for this, in the case of 
hospitals, lay with the regional hospital boards, until reorganisation. Then 
responsibility was shifted to the newly created Building Division of the 
Common Services Agency, which took over many of the staff originally 
employed by the boards. Again after reorganisation, and probably to some 
extent before it, each proposal was appraised with an economic element in 
mind. Two particular sets of choices had an explicit economic content: the 
choice offuel, introduced in 1965<35) and more recently the choice between 
building new and upgrading existing buildings. <36l Many other options 
would have been considered, several with an implicit economic content 
such as the choice of orientation and shape of a building, and options in the 
building elements such as the choice between flat and pitched roofs. <37) 
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Risk and Uncertainty 
We turn now to the second guideline the SHHD might be expected to 
implement without pressure from the Treasury to do so. Risk and 
uncertainty are inherent in most proposals. They are least important for 
proposals to replace existing facilities. They become more important when 
the provision of existing facilities is extended. They become most important 
when an entirely new programme is proposed. In the last case there may be 
little idea of its take-up by patients or of its benefit to them. But in all cases, 
even when existing facilities are replaced, risk and uncertainty cannot be 
avoided where the outcome of the proposal extends into the future. Thus 
the quite straightforward decision to replace a boiler involves the choice of 
fuels, whose relative cost could change. 
The Treasury suggests the use of sensitivity analysis as the means to 
cope with risk and uncertainty. It does not avoid the problem they cause, 
but it does indicate the extent to which the preferred option depends on the 
assumptions made. Ideally the selected option should be clearly preferred 
for all reasonable assumptions. If it is not, then judgement is required even 
in those cases where economic criteria alone would dictate the selection of 
options. 
We have only limited information on the extent to which risk and 
uncertainty were taken into account. It is our impression that at the earliest 
stages in the proposal, the regional hospital boards and their successors the 
health boards took little or no account of it. The next stage is the design 
guides and hospital planning notes produced by the SHHD and the Scottish 
Hospital Centre. An examination of them gives no suggestion that risk and 
uncertainty were taken into account either. Certainly none have been taken 
for the last stage of construction.<38l 
Backchecks and Monitoring 
The purpose behind this guideline is to learn from past mistakes. A 
systematic approach to this guideline requires an explicit statement of the 
objectives of the proposal and the assumptions behind the option 
eventually selected. 
There is evidence of some willingness to put this guideline into 
practice. The first stage involves a set of proposals made by the regional 
hospital boards and then by the health boards which have the SHHD's 
approval. The outcome- the Hospital (subsequently the Health) Plan for 
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for Scotland<39l published in 1962 had 'revisions' and 'reviews' to it 
published two and four years afterwards, respectively. (40) Revisions, 
usually accompanied by additions to the existing scheme, have been 
periodically announced.<41 l The latest revision, unlike its predecessors 
focuses on the bed requirements of individual health boards, and does not 
go so far as recommending particular schemes whose approval now 
depends on 'option appraisal'. <42l Even this latest effort recognises its own 
estimates will need periodic revision. 
There is also evidence of revisions by the SHHD and one of its agencies, 
the Scottish Hospital Centre, to their published hospital planning notes and 
design guides. We have identified six 'design in use' studies which have 
been published. Three were reviews of the operation of the hospital as a 
whole/43) two reviewed ward designs/44) and one reviewed the design of 
health centres. <45 l Shortcomings of existing designs were identified and 
corrections to them were made. However this work of 'backchecks and 
monitoring' lapsed when it was delegated to the Building Division due to a 
lack of resources to do it and of first hand information on maintenance costs 
to test the assumptions.<46l The regional hospital and health boards have 
also had a similar responsibility,<47l but it would appear not to have been 
carried out regularly if at all. 
Conclusions 
Three of the six guidelines indicated by the Treasury for inclusion in an 
economic appraisal of proposals might reasonably be expected to be 
adopted by the SHHD and the Scottish Health Service. Our analysis 
indicates they have a useful role, though it should be made clear that in the 
cases of these three there is nothing specifically 'economic' about them. 
Any appraisal might include all three. To make the appraisal economic and 
satisfy the Treasury's goal of an efficient allocation for the benefit of all 
parties it is necessary to include the three other guidelines as well. Their 
role will be evident in due course. 
There is mixed evidence for their adoption. There is no evidence of a 
systematic approach to risk and uncertainty. In the early days of the 1960s, 
when the major capital programme took off, there was a willingness to 
consider a variety of options in a systematic way and to check the practical 
value of proposed design solutions. However this work was largely at the 
initiative of the SHHD. It is not clear that the SHHD carried the regional 
hospital boards with them; and on reorganisation this enthusiasm seems to 
have evaporated. The same choices continue to be appraised, and there is 
little evidence of a willingness to expand the list. One might therefore hope 
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the Treasury's initiative will have an impact on the implementation of all 
three self-serving guidelines. 
The Identification of all Costs and Benefits 
The Treasury is quite clear that the appraisal of proposals should 
include all important costs and benefits, those falling on the private as well 
as the public sector, and not just on the organisation responsible for 
them.<48l In this way an efficient allocation of resources from the point of 
view of all begins to be possible. 
It is hardly to be expected that, without prompting, the SHHD and the 
Scottish Health Service would use this information in a way completely 
contrary to their own interests. Nevertheless, the obvious willingness to 
consider several sites for buildings suggests their receptivity to the interests 
of others. Just how far the SHHD and Scottish Health Service are willing to 
go in this direction partly depends on there being channels for the interests 
of others to be expressed and whether trading is possible. This section 
concentrates upon these possibilities. 
First it should be recognised that the structure of the SHHD and 
Scottish Health Service guarantees points of contact between them and 
other interest groups. In the end, the SHHD and the Scottish Health 
Service are accountable to the Secretary of State for Scotland and through 
him to Parliament, where the interests of other groups can also be 
represented. 
Second, since reorganisation of the NHS the Secretary of State has 
been advised by the Scottish Health Service Council, whose membership is 
drawn from all the major professional groups and from each health board 
and university with a medical school as well as from the SHHD.<49l The 
Council, for example, was consulted on the original statement of national 
priorities,<so) and was responsible for drafting the (revised) SHAPE Report 
published four years later. (SI) 
Third, there has been a continuing practice of involving several bodies 
with an interest in the NHS in its running. Before reorganisation the local 
authorities ran the community health services, and nominees from a variety 
of bodies were members of the regional hospital boards and boards of 
management. Many of the latter became members of the newly constituted 
health boards. Hunter<52l identified "local authorities, trade unions, 
voluntary bodies, business groups, churches and professional associations" 
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State. Health boards with a medical school also have a university 
representative. 
These nominees are expected to represent the interests of patients, 
though there might be some doubt about how far they would carry out this 
obligation. Imagine, for example, the situation of a trade unionist, from the 
National Union of Mineworkers, when told that solid fuel was not the 
preferred choice after an appraisal by the Building Division. 
The role of health boards is to "deal with major policy, strategic 
planning decisions, the broad allocation of resources and matters of 
substantial interest to the community". <53l Hunter, <54) drawing on a study of 
two health boards between 1975 and 1977, has cast serious doubt on their 
ability to do so. First, he states that members were unclear as to what was 
actually required of them, although their "enthusiastic" reception of the 
initial statement of priorities in 1976 suggests this impotency should have 
been short-lived. And second, he suggests that the health board officers 
tended to dominate the thinking of members because the former had the 
advantages of greater time, expertise and resources at their disposal. This 
problem is less easy to correct, but it depends on the debatable assumption 
that officers take the role of 'masters' ,not 'servants' to their members. 
Fourth, a variety of bodies have existed with whom the regional 
hospital boards, and their successors the health boards have been expected 
to consult. Thus the regional hospital boards were expected to consult local 
authorities, NHS Executive Councils and other interested parties when 
proposing a building scheme.<55l And health boards have also been 
expected to consult local authorities, the new constituted local health 
councils (about which we have more to write shortly), area professional 
consultative committees, staff associations, and any others with a "valid" 
interest when decisions involve the change in use of premises or their 
closure. (S6) 
Fifth, since the reorganisation of the NHS in 1974 there have been 
improvements in the machinery of negotiation between the health boards 
and the local community and local authorities. The first has come through 
the establishment oflocal health councils,<57l whose geographic boundaries 
of responsibility usually coincided with the district health authorities then 
in existence. <58l Like health board members, local health council members 
are nominated, not elected. Local authorities select their own nominees; 
and the health boards select the nominees of voluntary agencies, trade 
unions, and other bodies with an interest in the health services in that 
particular community. Local health council members are also expected to 
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represent the interests of the community as a whole and not the bodies 
which nominated them. Finally, they are also unpaid.<59l 
Whilst the composition of the membership of local health councils and 
health boards have much in common, they have been assigned different 
roles. As noted above, the health boards are expected to set priorities. 
Councils, on the other hand, are expected to act as a channel of 
communication between their health board and the local community, in 
both directions. They also have an advisory and monitoring role. For 
example, among the topics considered suitable for their examination are 
the quality of health services provided, plans for new services and changes 
in the use of existing services, facilities for patients, waiting lists and the co-
operation between the health service and the related local authorities 
services. (60) The investigation and reporting on individual complaints 
(which is the responsibility of the Ombudsman) and on the clinical 
treatment of individuals (with is the responsibility of the professions) are 
the only topics expressly excluded from the consideration of the councils, 
though they can advise individuals how and where to make their 
complaints. 
The resources at the health council's disposal are meagre. As noted 
above the members are unpaid, and their contributions must be fitted in 
with their several other commitments and, because they often serve 
voluntarily in other capacities, such free time as they can give to their local 
health council must be very limited. The members have the services of a 
paid secretary and access to health board papers relating to the interests of 
their council, but not much more. In the financial year 1982-83 the Greater 
Glasgow Health Board spent £93,000 on its five health councils out of a 
total revenue allocation of £370 millions. <61 l 
The second improvement is in the machinery of negotiation between 
the health boards and local authorities. It will be remembered that there are 
local authority nominees on the health boards and local health councils, 
and that local authorities must be consulted by the health boards when the 
use of premises is to be changed or they are to be closed. Nevertheless, it 
had been felt, prior to the reorganisation of the Scottish Health Service (in 
1974) and local government (in 1975) and afterwards, that the existing 
machinery left much to be desired and that joint liaison committees should 
be set up between the two bodies which would involve their members and 
senior officers. <62l Three years later committees were set up in most parts of 
Scotland. <63l 
Consultation is costly in time and effort. Yet it can offer positive 
291 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
benefits if handled in a sensible way. Consultation can draw out the special 
knowledge of the interested parties and so improve the decisions reached. 
Thus the local health council members may be more aware of the problems 
of physical access to the several proposed sites for a new health centre. 
Consultation can also act as a channel to communicate information, and so 
avoid misunderstandings and make proposals more acceptable. For 
example, a change in the use of premises may give a false impression that 
redundancies are expected, whereas in reality no redundancies are 
intended. Finally, consultation can help resolve the conflicts of interest that 
are bound to arise. Even if give-and-take is not possible in respect of any 
particular proposal, it may be feasible for a series of proposals over a period 
of time. 
We test the willingness ofthe SHHD and the Scottish Health Service to 
take account of the interests of them, even at some cost to themselves, by 
reference to the patient's geographic access to facilities. Judged by the 
principles for the design of casualty and accident departments<64> and the 
original Hospital Plan for Scotland<65> patient convenience was very low 
down on the list of priorities. What mattered was functional efficiency, with 
facilities being concentrated so that 24 hours a day care, of high quality, 
could be provided. Only occasional concessions were made to those living 
in peripheral areas such as Fort William, Dunoon and Oban. This ordering 
of priorities was still to be found some ten years later in the SHHD's design 
guide for health centres, <66> where the recommendations continued to be 
based on the size of the catchment population to be served and not its access 
to alternative facilities as well. 
Yet a change in emphasis has occurred. First, the Borders are to have a 
new district general hospital, even though the catchment population will be 
smaller than a similar hospital in the central belt of Scotland, and 
consideration is being given to a similar facility in Dunfermline instead of 
the continued reliance on hospitals in Edinburgh. Second, the SHHD has 
revised its recommendation in the design guide for health centres so that 
health centres with smaller catchment populations than previously may 
have X-ray facilities if access is otherwise difficult to obtain. <67> The policy 
was, for example, recently implemented in Ullapool. Finally, an analysis of 
the provision of out-patient clinics at health centres in Scotland indicates 
that patient convenience was a consideration, even at some cost to the 
health boards and consultants. <68> 
Consultation can, however, only go so far, at least as judged by 
existing shortcomings. Thus we find patients in hospital who do not need 
the medical and nursing services it offers, because there is no suitable place 
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to discharge them to; and there are others in the community who could 
benefit from just such hospital services if only accommodation were 
available. This leads to the sixth solution to trading between the Scottish 
Health Service and other bodies, which is particularly appropriate for 
conflicts of interests. This solution lies in the definition of the respective 
responsibilities of the various bodies. The SHHD has gone some way to 
doing this for the Scottish Health Service. <69> However it is not known how 
far other bodies have gone in the same direction. 
The definition of responsibilities, whilst helpful, is not the complete 
answer in practice. As the SHHD recognises it has interests that can 
"overlap" or be "complementary" to other bodies like the local authorities 
and voluntary agencies, which can make a division of responsibilities that is 
acceptable to all difficult to achieve. It was to overcome this problem,P0> 
and to encourage local authorities to take over their responsibility for those 
no longer requiring continuous nursing and medical care, that in 1980 the 
SHHD earmarked some of its own funds to help finance projects set up and 
run by local authorities. These funds came under the general title of 
'support finance'. <71> 
The SHHD finances up to 60% of the capital costs and, initially, up to 
60% of the revenue costs which tapers off after five years. Thereafter the 
local authority would be responsible for the full financial cost of the 
proposal. The proposals are submitted by the health boards, but none of 
the earmarked funds are allocated to them. The financial estimate for 
'support finance' in the year 1982-83 was £2 million. However, as can be 
seen from the table, five of the fifteen health boards still had no schemes in 
operation and only half of the allocation was spent. (?2) In the following year 
£2.7 millions was spent and it would have been much higher still had not 
Strathclyde Regional Council continued its opposition to participation. 
Another cash transfer scheme which will modify the conflict of 
interests between the Scottish Health Service and local authorities where 
their interests "overlap" and are "complementary" is a development in 
Supplementary Benefit provision which took effect in November 1983. It is 
now possible for local authorities and health boards to relieve themselves of 
the financial responsibility of persons eligible for supplementary benefit 
who have been admitted to a registered nursing or residential home on or 
after the date when the new provision took effect. Since registration rests 
with the health boards (for nursing homes) and local authorities (for 
residential homes) their only constraint would, superficially, seem to be the 
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In conclusion, consultation can lead to better and more acceptable 
decisions being made when more than one party is involved. But conflicts of 
interest are inevitable. These can be resolved by negotiation, if the various 
parties have something to negotiate. And the willingness of the SHHD to 
use financial incentives in the Scottish Health Service's relations with local 
authorities is a move in this direction although, for one reason or another, 
the response of local authorities has been less than enthusiastic. However, 
the Treasury expects more than a 'quid pro quo'. It expects its agents, 
including the SHHD and the Scottish Health Service, to be prepared to 
take decisions against their own interests if they thereby serve the general 
interest. It is perhaps expecting a lot, yet in recent years there is some 
evidence of this accommodation with the Scottish Health Service in 
circumstances that were not forced upon it by the Treasury. One may 
expect the accommodation to be still more evident in proposals that have 
required the Treasury's approval. 
The Quantification of Costs and Benefits 
As far as possible all important costs and benefits should be quantified, 
preferably in financial terms and based on the economist's concept of 
'opportunity cost'. <73> This concept values resources in terms of their best 
alternative use, and not necessarily in terms of what is paid for them. For 
practical purposes the Treasury accepts the two are approximately equal in 
value,04> though there are notable exceptions to which we make some later 
reference. 
The requirement to include all important costs and benefits can 
involve putting values not only on those borne by the Scottish Health 
Service but also on others, such as local authorities and other groups 
identified in the previous section. To contain this section within reasonable 
bounds we examine the application of the opportunity cost concept to the 
Scottish Health Service's own activities. Parallels with other bodies will be 
evident, but it is not our purpose to indicate them. Our general conclusion 
is that past deficiencies in the application of the concept of opportunity cost 
have largely been removed, although one important one still remains. 
The overwhelming expenditure by the Scottish Health Service is on 
goods and (labour) services, and the Treasury has accepted valuing them in 
terms of their market prices is an acceptable measure of their opportunity 
cost. <75) To this extent there is no practical difference between economists 
and other professional groups, in particular accountants, engineers and 
surveyors, when putting a value on the resources used. 
Where practice differs between economists and the other professional 
groups is in their valuation of resources- in this case (equipment), land and 
buildings - already in the possession of the Scottish Health Service. 
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Economists would expect these assets have an income or realiseable value 
inputed to them just as much as would actually occur if they were not in its 
ownership. Ideally, the ownership of an asset should make no difference to 
the value of its best alternative use. It is a criticism of past practice that it 
once did, and may still do so. Those responsible for their use may, 
nevertheless, have valued them as an economist would, given the 
circumstances they faced. Thus if they treated property as though it were a 
'free good', then more likely than not, for them, it had no alternative use. 
There can be little doubt that this 'misuse' of property arose from the 
constraints put on its realisable value on the open market, so that the 
opportunity cost to the user was (much) less than it could have been. As we 
now show these constraints have largely been removed, and hopefully the 
distortions that went with them. 
Three distinct kinds of constraints can be identified. The first is the 
requirement, when property is to be developed, that first refusal be given to 
other government departments, then to local authorities, and only then 
may the property be put on the open market. This requirement was 
removed in 1979, and property may go straight onto the local open 
market. <76> The second constraint is the free transfer between government 
departments. This was removed in April 1983, and now the full market 
price must be paid.(77) The third constraint is the inability of the Scottish 
Health Service to obtain planning permission from local authorities for 
property it might wish to dispose. It could obtain a planning opinion, but 
this is less binding on the local authority and so worth less to any 
prospective buyer. Thus, in 1967, one property was valued at £30,000 in its 
current use as agricultural land, but might have been worth £1.75 million 
with planning permission for its commercial development. <78) There had 
been some uncertainty as to the ability of government departments to 
obtain planning permission.<79> But the government has accepted its 
desirability, and necessary letgslative changes have been introduced to 
remove any further ambiguity. SO) 
The removal of these three constraints means that the SHHD can 
obtain the full open market price on such property as it wishes to dispose. 
Equally it must pay this price for any it acquires, even from another 
government department. As a result one may not only hope, but also 
expect the Scottish Health Service to make better use of its property from 
the point of view of society as a whole. However, the removal of these 
constraints will not effectively bring together the different perspectives of 
economists and other professional groups such as accountants, engineers 
and surveyors in valuing assets in the Scottish Health Service's possession. 
Given these past constraints, it is to be expected that the SHHD and 
Scottish Health Service would have property surplus to their requirements. 
The problem then comes in identifying it. In some cases the surplus may 
arise from the SHHD's own National Building Programme and be self-
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evident. But others will be less obvious to the SHHD and may only be 
known to the health boards. And if one recognises that some property is 
under used, and to that extent is also surplus to requirements, then the need 
to obtain 'grass roots' information becomes even more important. 
The DHSS has taken a variety of measures to obtain this 
information,<80 but the Scottish Health Service has largely relied on 
financial incentives by agreeing to return to the health boards part or all of 
the proceeds from the sale of their property. This scheme was introduced in 
1977 when the full amount up to £30,000 per sale was returned. <82) The limit 
has subsequently been raised: to £60,000 in 1981 and to £100,000 in 1984.<83) 
Information on the sums returned to the various health boards in the 
financial year 1982-83 is given in the table. It will be seen that all but four of 
the fifteen health boards benefitted to some extent, but that the sums 
involved were trivial in relation to their final (revenue plus ordinary capital) 
allocation. The SHHD also put restrictions on the use of these funds to 
conform with the national programme of priorities. 
Parliament also imposes constraints on the use of the funds it votes. 
Generally, funds it votes for any given year must be spent that year and may 
not be spent later. In addition, funds voted for specific purposes must be 
spent on that purpose and not on any other. Since spending decisions within 
the SHHD and Scottish Health Service tend to be implemented at the 
health board level and below, it is easy to imagine the distortions that can 
arise. For example, rather than have a large shortfall of expenditure in 
relation to its allocated budget, one health board suddenly approved the 
purchase of a body scanner at a cost of £400,000, whose subsequent annual 
revenue consequences were estimated to be £50,000. (B4) Equally, the lack of 
'virement' - the ability to transfer funds between votes - can bring a 
mismatch between revenue and ordinary capital allocations with, say, 
sufficient funds to build facilities but insufficient funds to run them. 
In practice, however, the system of financial control is more flexible 
than the Parliamentary votes would suggest. First, the SHHD votes comes 
within the Scottish Office general vote, and the Secretary of State ha 
discretion in allocating its share of that total prior to obtaining Cabinet 
approval. Its share can be subsequently adjusted - though not the overall 
total- only with the Treasury's prior approval. In the past that approval has 
usually been given. 
Second, whilst the hospital and community health, but not the family 
practitioner<ss) services are cash limited, the SHHD has allowed health 
boards a limited ability to shift funds between financial years. Since the 
financial year 1976-77 the health boards have been allowed to 'carry-
forward' underspending up to 1% of their combined total of revenue and 
ordinary capital allocations. (S6) As one would expect, under cash limits 
health boards which have exceeded their allocations have had the full 
296 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1985 
amount deducted from the following year's allocation. The health boards 
have also been able to shift funds between financial years in a more planned 
way, with their ability to 'bank' or 'borrow' funds with the SHHD. These 
funds are protected against inflation. However, the SHHD has required to 
be notified of the health boards' plans within one month of the beginning of 
the financial year and, in recent years, the health boards only knew their 
initial allocations less than one month before the financial year began. It is 
important to appreciate that both these schemes to transfer funds between 
financial years are an arrangement internal to the SHHD. The department 
itself is subject to the Treasury discipline of cash limits. 
Data on the extent of 'carry forward' to the next (1983-84) financial 
year, and on 'banking' and the final allocations in the current (1982-83) 
financial year by health board and for all health boards are given in the 
table. It will be noticed that two health boards overspent their approved 
budget, in the Western Isles case by an extent which was purely accidental; 
and three were close to the 1% limit. Overall £4.3 million was underspent, 
0.38% of the final allocation. Seven of the fifteen health boards used the 
'banking' facility with the SHHD: six to defer expenditure, and one to bring 
it forward or to draw upon accumulated balances. Marginally less, £3.5 
million, was credited to health boards for future expenditure this way than 
from the 'carry forward' arrangement. 
The restriction on the transfer of funds between votes is also more 
flexible than the Parliamentary votes would suggest. It has already been 
noted that the Treasury is receptive to requests for transfers of funds 
between votes, so long as the cash limits total is not exceeded. In addition, 
the SHHD in effect allows the health boards 100% 'virement'- i.e. the full 
transfer of funds- between their revenue and ordinary capital allocations. 
Earmarked funds are excluded, of course, but they are trivial in magnitude 
compared with the health boards' total allocations. Non-cash limited family 
practitioner services are also excluded for the obvious reason that the 
SHHD would then lose control over health board expenditure completely. 
In recent years the SHHD has allocated about half its capital budget to the 
health boards, although the proportion varies widely from year-to-year. 
The total allocated is distributed between the health boards on the same 
principle as their revenue allocations, i.e. using the SHARE formula. (8?) 
Data on the ordinary capital allocated to health boards and on that 
actually spent are given in the table for the financial year 1982-83. Only 
three health boards spent less than their allocation, and six exceeded their 
allocation by more than 20%. Combining all health boards, expenditure 
exceeded the amount allocated by 15%. Marginally more use was made of 
'virement' than either 'carry-over' or 'banking' to redistribute the health 
boards' allocations. Combining all three schemes of transfer, then for all 
health boards some 1.05% of the final allocation was effectively carried 
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'carry-forward' and 'virement'. For some individual health boards this 
proportion was much larger: for example, it was 2.37% for Argyll and 
Clyde Health Board. 
The final financial constraint is on the unit costs of construction, 
referred to as 'departmental cost allowances'. They have a long history. 
The levels are set by the SHHD, with reference to negotiations between the 
Treasury and the DHSS, and apply to all capital schemes however financed 
and approved. They are intended to contain capital expenditure without 
the need to review, in detail, individual schemes before their approval. The 
only regular revisions to the departmental cost allowances are for 
significant and permanent increases in building costs for the industry as a 
whole. No trade-off between the allowance set and its revenue 
consequences is permitted, and the incentive to innovate must be greatly 
dampened. No moves have been made to remove this constraint. 
The discussion so far has concentrated on the extent to which the 
signals to those making decisions about the use of resources within the 
Scottish Health Service reflect the full opportunity cost of these resources. 
Finally we turn briefly to the extent to which the benefits of proposals-
in so far as they are the outcome of proposals - are properly valued in the 
Scottish Health Service. Usually, in fact, they are not measured at all. First, 
there is the problem of knowing what the outcome is likely to be. When that 
is known, the problem of valuing it remains. These two problems largely 
explain the exemptions given to strategic decisions and clinical activities 
from option appraisal and cost -benefit analysis, respectively, before their 
approval in principle. 
It is the position of this paper that such an attitude is unduly restrictive. 
Whilst there is no answer economists can give to measuring the outcome of 
health services, they have much experience in putting a value on it, once it is 
known. Perhaps the attempts at putting a value on human life<88> can hardly 
expect to gain universal acceptance just yet. But there are many other 
benefits from medical intervention or care whose valuation would be much 
less contentious: for example, the saving of travel time as well as travel costs 
to patients by decentralising the provision of facilities. 
In conclusion, we have every reason to expect that the real cost of 
resources within the Scottish Health Service is now recognised by those 
using them, or at least by others responsible for their use. To that extent 
better decisions should now be made. The only exception identified is the 
continued use of department cost allowances which limit the unit costs of 
construction. However, caution must be exercised so that assets in the 
ownership of the Scottish Health Service are not assumed to be free in any 
evaluations of proposals. Finally, the inability and unwillingness to 
measure the benefits of programmes is a severe and, to some extent, an 
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unnecessary constraint on the range of proposals which have an economic 
element in their proposal. Economists need to be given a freer hand so that 
the effect of this constraint can be reduced and option appraisal be more 
widely adopted. 
Discounting 
When the Treasury originally recommended investment (i.e. option) 
appraisal for the public sector it was discounting it had in mind, rather than 
any of the other guidelines identified in this paper, and it was to be applied 
only to the nationalised industries. The reasoning is that the nationalised 
industries did not have direct access to the capital market, as did the private 
commercial sector, but instead obtained funds indirectly and on more 
favourable terms. Given the implicit assumption that the two sectors were 
in competition for limited capital finance, it was felt necessary to impose 
some sort of economic as well as financial discipline. One method chosen 
was to require the nationalised industries to secure a rate of return on their 
investment thought to be at least comparable to that obtained in the private 
sector. The rate required is referred to as the 'test discount rate' and 
represents, in effect, the opportunity cost of capital employed by the 
nationalised industries. This reasoning has not changed, even when, as in 
1969, the request to discount was extended to all public sector 
investment, (S9) including that funded through the SHHD. The exemption of 
strategic decisions and clinical activities from option appraisal means that in 
the Scottish Health Service discounting will serve the useful but rather 
limited role of screening out options whose additional capital requirements 
fail to satisfy the test discount rate. 
The test discount rate has been changed periodically, and is set 
assuming constant prices, i.e. no inflation. Initially it was 8% per annum: in 
1969 it was changed to 10%; and in 1978 it was changed to 5% and to 7% 
when a cost-benefit analysis of a public service such as the Scottish Health 
Service was involved. (90) For practical purposes 5% is now used for almost 
all proposals by cental government, except by the Department of Transport 
in its appraisal of roads. 
In the sub-section on the selection of options, three sets of choices 
were indicated. We assess the use and importance of discounting for each of 
them in turn. The first set of choices made by the regional hospital boards, 
and their successors the health boards, concerns the catchment populations 
to be served, the site for the hospital, its mix of facilities and the phasing of 
its construction. Even if the capital and full revenue consequences of each 
option had been estimated in financial terms, it is unlikely that discounting 
was used to make the estimates commensurable. It is probably only 
recently, with the new styled 'option apprais;U' that both parts of the 
appraisal have been included. However, the past omission of discounting in 
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choice except the last named one, the phasing of construction. 
The second set of choices concerns the design of hospital departments 
and health centres. Again the study groups would have been conscious of 
the capital and revenue consequences of the different options. But, again, it 
is doubtful whether discounting came into the picture in a formal manner. 
The design guides and hospital planning notes still form the basis of health 
service planning, and any serious errors as a result of past omissions are 
now embodied in current conventional wisdom. 
The third set of choices concerns the building of the facilities. It is in 
this respect that discounting is known to have been used in a systematic if 
limited way for a number of years. Two choices where discounting has been 
given a central role are the choice offuel<91 l and the choice between building 
new or upgrading an existing facility. <92l Discounting is part of the training 
of engineers and surveyors just as much as for management accountants. 
This is not to say that they are very familiar with it; and the manual 
produced by the DHSS,<93l to show how widely it could be used, has been 
available to engineers and surveyors in the Scottish Health Service. 
However, the existence of cost allowances has been a severe deterrent on 
their use of discounting on a day-to-day basis. There is little point in 
evaluating metal versus wooden frames if the cost allowances exclude the 
former. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
This paper opened with two quotations, both from experienced civil 
servants and both suggesting that option/investment appraisal may be 
expected to have a modest impact. What does our review of the experience 
suggest for the Scottish Health Service? 
Option appraisal is the title given by the SHHD (and DHSS) to the set 
of Treasury guidelines intended to introduce an economic element into the 
appraisal of proposals. Three of the guidelines are the type that 
independent agents, whether the health boards or the SHHD itseif, might 
be expected to adopt. In the early 1960s the SHHD and the regional 
hospital boards did consider a limited variety of options, but there is little 
evidence that the list has been extended. The SHHD and the Scottish 
Hospital Centre also appraised many of the design solutions for their 
efficiency, but this process of backchecks and monitoring seem to have 
largely disappeared on reorganisation. It is hardly done at all now for 
individual schemes, as is required. Such evidence of its continuance, as 
exists, is the periodic revision of bed requirements. Finally, there is no 
evidence of adjustments being taken for risk and uncertainty. In respect of 
all three guidelines there seems room for improvement, and the Treasury's 
reminder of their value should not be ignored. 
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The three remaining guidelines are specifically economic in their 
content. The requirement to include all costs and benefits has already been 
met, to some degree, and the Scottish Health Service has shown some 
willingness to serve the interests of other parties at its own expense. A 
proper valuation of these costs and benefits would indicate if they have 
gone too far in this direction or need to go further. There has been an 
improvement in that valuation in respect of its own resources, with three 
notable exceptions: the continued application of cost allowances to capital 
expenditure and the exemption of strategic decisions and clinical activities. 
The exemption of clinical activities is unduly restrictive. The DHSS has 
begun to recognise its value. More importantly, so has the medical 
profession. The door to the economic evaluation of clinical activities is not 
shut; it is only its hinges which are stiff. Rather less, however, can be said 
for the willingness of the Scottish Health Service to put a correct value on 
the resources of others, even when it is sensitive to the impact its 
programmes may have on them. However, the new styled option appraisals 
are a movement in the right direction, because they identify explicitly some 
of the limits these values should have. Do individual patients living in Fife 
justify an additional £500 of expenditure to obtain acute in-patient care in 
Dunfermline rather than in Edinburgh, <94l even if other issues are also 
involved? Finally, several professional groups employed by the Scottish 
Health Service have been taught about discounting; but there is little 
evidence of the familiarity that comes from its everyday use. Departmental 
cost allowances may inhibit the engineers and surveyors. But there is less 
excuse for the (management) accountants. Nevertheless, there has been a 
noticeable improvement in the use of these specifically economic guidelines 
compared with the 1960s, even if there is no room for complacency. 
Finally, option appraisal can be costly in time and resources, especially 
for major capital projects of a 'one-off' type. Two years is not an unrealistic 
estimate for some hospital schemes. No doubt if the time can be spared the 
exercise could be justified too,. But if appraisals are to be applied to all 
capital proposals, with the familiar exemptions, then more use must be 
made of the routine practices adopted by the Building Division, for 
example in the choice -between building new and upgrading existing 
facilities. This mechanistic approach may seem counter to the spirit behind 
the original introduction of appraisal- see the Foster quote- but it provides 
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